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Abstrat
We present numerial results on a omplex dynamial model for the aggregation
of many individual rankings of S alternatives by the pairwise majority rule under
a deliberative senario. Agents are assumed to interat when the Kemeny distane
between their rankings is smaller than a range R. The main objet of interest is
the probability that the aggregate (soial) ranking is transitive as a funtion of the
interation range. This quantity is known to deay fast as S inreases in the non-
interating ase. Here we nd that when S > 4 suh a probability attains a sharp
maximum when the interation range is suiently large, in whih ase it signi-
antly exeeds the orresponding value for a non-interating system. Furthermore,
the situation improves upon inreasing S. A possible mirosopi mehanism leading
to this ounterintuitive result is proposed and investigated.
Key words: soial hoie, Condoret paradox, pairwise majority rule
PACS: 89.65.-s, 05.10.-a, 02.50.Ey
1 Introdution
The aggregation of many individual preferenes into a single, soial prefer-
ene is a long-studied problem in mathematial soial sienes whih has more
reently also been onsidered from a statistial mehanis viewpoint. Here by
preferene we mean simply a ranking of say S objets, i.e. a omplete or-
dering e.g. from the favorite downwards. A minimal onsisteny requirement
⋆
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for preferenes is that they should be transitive, i.e. if A is preferred to B and
B to C, then A should be preferred to C. It is however well known that as
soon as S exeeds 2 the onstrution of the aggregate preferene runs into the
Condoret problem [13℄: starting from transitive individual preferenes, the
soial preferene may turn out to be intransitive, i.e. ontain a yle of the type
A ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A (meaning A preferred to B et.). The probability with whih
an intransitive ranking emerges from random individual preferenes (`impar-
tial ulture assumption' [4℄) has been studied in the mathematial eonomis
literature in the past [57℄. Remarkably, this bottlenek is present to dierent
degrees for all aggregation methods one onsiders and an be removed only
at the ost of loosening some of the requirements that a soial hoie should
satisfy
1
.
Among the dierent aggregation methods, the pairwise-majority rule (PMR)
has been the most studied as it appears to be more robust to the above men-
tioned requirements. Aording to PMR, the soial preferene orresponds to
that derived by omparing objets pairwise via a simple majority rule. Re-
ently it has been possible to quantify the extent to whih PMR is eetive as
a soial hoie rule by omputing the probability that the aggregate of N ≫ 1
random preferenes is transitive within a statistial mehanis framework [8℄.
It is similarly important to understand how the situation hanges if voters
interat before asting their ballot. In [8℄, a random-eld type of interation
with onformism has been onsidered, and it has been shown, among other
results, that an interating population may reah onsensus on one of S is-
sues more easily the larger is S. A senario that has reeived muh attention
reently is the so-alled deliberative approah [9℄, where voters disuss the al-
ternatives before the vote and eventually hange their preferenes. The idea is
that disussion should lead to preferene harmonization and struturing and
thus drastially redue the probability of an intransitive soial hoie.
In this paper we study the deliberative senario in a dynamial model of N
interating agents or voters, whose preferenes are initialized to transitive
random ones to simulate the original diversity of opinions. The key ingredient
of the model is that an agent interats only with agents whose preferenes are
suiently lose to his. In suh neighborhoods, by onformity he aligns to
the PMR-aggregate preferene (if transitive). This generalizes a lassial soial
interation mehanism investigated previously in e.g. [10,11℄. As a measure of
similarity between orderings we use the Kemeny distane [12,13℄, widely used
in the soial sienes (it is related to their Hamming distane). This hoie
is arbitrary and it is likely that distanes more sensitive to the position in
the orderings may give dierent results. A soial preferene is then formed via
PMR after every agent has updated his preferene.
1
This is for example the ase of plurality voting, whih avoids the Condoret prob-
lem but is vulnerable to tatial voting (see also [3℄).
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We are interested in studying the behavior of a spei marosopi observ-
able, namely the probability of a transitive aggregate ranking as a funtion
of time (number of system-wide updates) and of the range of interation (the
maximum distane within whih agents interat). Our main result is that
there is an optimal interation range (or more properly a window of ranges)
for whih the Condoret problem is muh less likely to our than in the non-
interating ase, and that the frustration dereases as a funtion of both time
and S. The model will be fully dened in the following setion. Its omplexity
has prevented analytial approahes on our side. Our results are thus obtained
by means of numerial simulations.
2 Denition of the model
Consider N agents (labeled by i, j, . . .) eah of whom ranks S alternatives
a1, a2, ..., aS. A ranking is a omplete transitive ordering suh as a1 ≻ a2 ≻
a3 ≻ ... ≻ aS. At time zero, every agent possesses a transitive preferene
ranking seleted randomly with uniform probability among the S! possible
ones. Every ranking an be split uniquely into pair-wise omparisons of S(S−
1)/2 pairs of distint alternatives. We label pairs as α, β, . . . and denote by Q
(α)
i
agent i's preferenes on pair α = (aα1 , aα2). Speially, Q
(α)
i = 1 if aα1 ≻ aα2
and Q
(α)
i = −1 otherwise (ties are exluded). The dissimilarity between the
rankings of agents i and j is given by their Kemeny distane
K(i, j) =
2
S(S − 1)
∑
α
(
1− δ
Q
(α)
i
,Q
(α)
j
)
, (1)
where the sum runs over all S(S − 1)/2 pairs. K(i, j) measures simply the
normalized number of pairs that are ranked dierently by agents i and j,
irrespetive of the position in the alignment, or in other words it is the number
of adjaent pairwise swithes needed to onvert one preferene order into the
other.
We introdue an interation range 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and dene the neighborhood of
i as the set of agents whose rankings have a Kemeny distane of at most R
from his:
V (i) = {j suh that K(i, j) ≤ R} (2)
At every time step, an agent is seleted randomly and interation takes plae.
Speially, the agent hanges his ranking to that derived from a PMR among
agents in his neighborhood if the latter is transitive, otherwise he keeps his
preferene unhanged. In subsequent interations the agents enters with his
new ranking. After a system-wide update (sweep) is performed a global vote
by PMR takes plae, the soial ranking is omputed and agents move into the
next round. We desribe details of the PMR proedure below (see also [8℄). We
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notie that as R dereases from 1 to 0 the interation beomes more and more
of a loal nature. However it is to be expeted that the number of surviving
rankings dereases in time as the loal interation mimis onformist behavior
on the side of agents. Furthermore, neighborhoods evolve in time (also inside
a single system-wide update).
The basi funtion whih is numerially evaluated in this study is the prob-
ability that PMR yields a soial transitive ranking, denoted by P (S). It is
evaluated by ounting the number of times a olletive transitive order is
obtained through PMR, out of a large number of samples. We monitor the
evolution of P (S) in time speially varying the number U of sweeps. In
absene of interation, P (S) deays as S inreases, though less fast than the
naïve guess S!/2S(S−1)/2 orresponding to the ratio of the number of transitive
rankings to the total number of binary vetors enoding dierent rankings of
S objets [7, 8℄.
Coming to the details of PMR voting, for eah pair α, let
M (α) = Θ
(
N∑
i=1
Q
(α)
i
)
, (3)
where Θ(x) is Heaviside funtion. Clearly, M (α) = 1 if the majority of agents
prefers aα1 over aα2 , whereas M
(α) = 0 if the majority ranks aα2 over aα1 .
The aggregate order (either loal or global) emerges from separate majority
votes over all pairs, that is from a omputation of the M (α), for all α. There
is a simple method to hek whether a ranking dened through the dierent
M (α)'s is transitive. Indeed eah M (α) an be seen as the element of a S × S
matrix sine α = (α1, α2). Let us then write expliitly M
(α)
as M (α1,α2) and
let
Cα1 =
S∑
α2=1
M (α1,α2) (4)
One easily understands (e.g. by indution starting from small N and S) that
if the PMR ranking is transitive, then the S-vetor ~C will ontain one and
only one eah of the integers 0, 1, 2, ..., S − 1 as elements.
3 Results
In Fig. 1 we display the time evolution (in units of sweeps) of P (5) as a
funtion of R for a system of size N = 1001 (the hoie of 5 alternatives
is here only a matter of onveniene; qualitatively idential results our for
larger values of S). It is evident that after just a yles the dependene of P (5)
on the radius of interation beomes stable. It is lear, also from this graph,
the onset of a peuliar regime in a window of interation radii omprised
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Fig. 1. P (S) as a funtion of the interation range R and of the number of sweeps
U . Parameters: N = 1001, S = 5; average over 1000 samples.
between R = 0.6 and R = 0.9, where the probability of getting a transitive
ranking is onsiderably enhaned with respet to the non interating ase. It
is also worth noting that, until R is suiently small, P (5) is almost onstant
and oinident with the orresponding probability in the non interating ase;
then it abruptly inreases and reahes the value of 0.9 at R = 0.8. For larger
ranges, P (5) dereases again to the non-interating ase.
In order to haraterize the saling of the distribution with inreasing system
size, in Fig. 2 we show the dependene of P (5) on the number of agents N and
on the radius of interation R (the asymptoti states is reahed in all ases
shown). The referene value for a non-interating system is P (5) ≃ 0.54.
Remarkably, the existene of an optimal interation range is reinfored by
inreasing the number of alternatives, as shown in Fig. 3. Note that for S = 4
the probability of getting a transitive majority ranking is still that of the non-
interating ase. For S > 5 this probability inreases, with a gradual gain
whih abruptly falls down for larger R.
To shed light on these observations, we report in Fig. 4, for dierent S, the
R-dependene of the average fration of neighbors, i.e. the average number of
agents with preferene orders whose Kemeny distane does not exeed R. This
parameter is omputed, after U sweeps, by reording the number of neighbors
of eah agent in a sample and averaging over samples. By inreasing S there
is a marked tendeny of the urve to aquire a sigmoidal shape. The average
fration of neighbors inreases gradually, with a maximum rate at R ≃ 0.5,
and saturates to 1 for large enough R. This result indiates that there is a
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Fig. 2. P (5) as a funtion of the radius of interation R and the number of agents N
after U = 5 sweeps. Average over 1000 samples. For R = 0 and R = 1 one reovers
the value observed for the non interating ase.
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Fig. 3. P (S) normalized by the orresponding P (S)n.i. for non interating agents as
a funtion of R. Parameters are the same as in the previous gure, exept for S = 7,
for whih N = 6001 and the average is performed over 500 samples. Here, U = 15.
ooperative transition between a loal regime and a global, eetively long
range, regime. In the former, eah agent interats and onfronts its preferene
order only with a small mass of the other agents; in the latter, eah agent's
opinion is inuened by the opinions of most of the others. Note that in the
ases S = 3 and S = 4 the R dependene is monotonously inreasing, but
no sign of ooperativity is present yet, in aordane with the result of the
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Fig. 4. Average fration of neighbors as a funtion of R and S. Parameters are the
same as in the previous gure.
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Fig. 5. Mean fration of dierent transitive preferene orders surviving after U = 15
sweeps as a funtion of R. Parameters are the same as in the previous gure.
previous gure.
To investigate further this transition, we onsider in Fig. 5 the R dependene
of the mean fration of dierent transitive preferene orders present in a pop-
ulation of agents after a long update yle. Remember that initially, before
the update yle starts, transitive preferene orders are randomly distributed
among the agents. Below R ≃ 0.6 the interation preserves all the possible
diversity of preferene orders, while above the ooperative transition has taken
plae and there is a redution of diversity. For S > 5 at R = 0.8 only about ten
perent of the possible dierent transitive rankings are still present among the
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Fig. 6. Fration of samples in whih only one ranking survives after U = 15 sweeps
as a funtion of R. Parameters are the same as in the previous gure.
agents. Note that for suiently large R one observes an inrease of dierent
transitive preferene order, as is to be expeted in view of the fat that the
interation mehanism in systems with very large and very small R is qualita-
tively similar. This phenomenon should be onfronted with the result in Fig.
6, where the R-dependene of the fration of samples with only one surviving
preferene order. Note, that at R = 1 this fration oinides, for dierent S,
with the orresponding P (S) values of the non interating ase. Figures 5 and
6 show that update interation yles indue, if the ooperative transition is
established, a redution of the dierent transitive preferene orders among
whih to hoose in the PMR. Moreover, for large enough interation radii,
when pratially eah agents interats with all the others, there is a marked
tendeny towards the emergene of a dominant transitive preferene order. As
is to be expeted, this tendeny is ontrasted by the inrease in S, the number
of alternatives.
In Fig. 7 and 8 we show the pair distribution funtion of the Kemeny distanes
among individual rankings, as a funtion of R. We onsider in these gures the
disriminating ases: S = 4 and S = 5. In both ases, if R is less than 0.5, the
pair distribution has a maximum for K = 0.5 (orresponding to S(S − 1)/4
adjaent pairwise swithes needed to onvert one ranking into the other). This
is essentially the pair distribution funtion orresponding to the initial random
assignment of preferene orders. As an eet of the interation it is seen that,
when the ooperative transition is ompleted, i.e. for large enough R, a peak
at K = 0 emerges, orresponding to the formation of a big lique of agents
with the same transitive preferene order. This points to an interesting herding
eet, whose details deserve further investigation.
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Fig. 7. Pair distribution funtion D(K) of the Kemeny distanes between the prefer-
ene orders of pairs of dierent agents, after the interation proess. S = 4 U = 15;
N = 1001 and 1000 samples.
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Fig. 8. Pair distribution funtion D(K) of the Kemeny distanes K between the
preferene orders of pairs of dierent agents, after the interation proess. S = 5
U = 15; N = 1001 and 1000 samples.
4 Disussion and Conlusions
We have studied the emergene of the Condoret problem in a deliberative
multi-agent senario. We have studied in partiular if and how the frustration
9
expressed by Condoret's paradox an be mitigated by interation among the
agents, before the global PMR voting takes plae. We have introdued an
interation sheme based on loal PMR voting among neighboring agents,
whose preferene orders are lose, to mimi onformist behavior. Our results
point to the existene of two regimes ontrolled by the interation range R,
with a rossover from one to the other at intermediate R. For low R, the
probability of getting a transitive outome is unaeted (with respet to the
non-interating ase), whereas for suiently large R a marked enhanement
in P (S) is observed, whih inreases with S, the number of alternatives to
be ranked. A herding phenomenon is furthermore observed whih redues the
repertoire of dierent surviving rankings. So, if the radius of interation is too
large it is diult to have a transitive PMR outome, but in the ase it is
reahed that happens beause all the agents pratially vote in the same way.
These results support the laims that deliberative systems redue the hane
for the formation of yles in the soial hoie, provided the interation range
lies in the optimal window. It would be important to get a deeper insight on the
mirosopi details of this model. In partiular the omputation of two point
orrelations, like the probability that after an interation yle two agents
taken at random belong to the same neighborhood, or the probability that af-
ter the interation two initially separated neighborhoods beome overlapping.
The further investigation of the lustering dynamis (inluding oalesene
of neighborhoods) ould provide important insight also in diretions dierent
than statistial mehanis [14℄.
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